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INTRODUCTION
The independence of Namibia in March 1990 brought a new phase in the war for 
independence and social justice in Southern Africa. Coming after the decisive defeat 
of the South African Defence Force (SADF) at Cuito Cuanavale in Angola, the 
implementation of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 435 led to the 
withdrawal of the South African troops from Namibia. This retreat, the internal 
uprisings and defiance campaigns, along with the international isolation of apartheid, 
precipitated the unbanning of the liberation movements and the release of Nelson 
Mandela in February 1990. The new political process in the Nineties in Southern Africa 
was marked by the call for reforms in the society.
The language of reform was a marked contrast from the earlier legitimation language, 
that the South African state was facing a total assault from the liberation forces in league 
with international communism. Throughout the previous 20-year period, the SADF was 
the central pillar of the form of governance called apartheid. The political and social 
changes in the region of Southern Africa pointed to two main choices, either a 
recomposition of the system without its racial form or a dismantling of the present forms 
of destruction and converting the factories which produce weapons of destruction for 
the production of food, housing, water, clothing and the economic restructuring of the 
society.
Those who bore the brunt of the destruction imposed by the militarization of the region 
were seeking peace and democracy. However, the articulation of how this peace could 
be secured was still elusive considering the vast economic resources which had been 
deployed into the military. This quest for peace also involved the search for a new mode 
of economic organization not only in South Africa but also in the region of Southern 
Africa. Between 1980 and 1990 more than two million lives had been snuffed out by the 
militarization of the region and over US$70 billion had been wasted by destabilization.1
Yet when analyzing the objective conditions of war and destabilization there has been 
very little documentation of the impact of the war at the subjective level in South Africa 
and Southern Africa. Economic destruction, celebration of the role of violence and the 
culture of capital have had a debilitating effect on the human spirit. The legacies of 
refugees, amputees, displaced persons and township violence pointed to the distortion 
of the human spirit and its effects on the consciousness of the peoples.
The culture of resistance which acted as the basis for the objective organization of the 
liberation movements and popular groups now seeks to find expression in new forms of 
participation beyond the alienation of the culture of capital. The disinformation and 
psychological war of the SADF has fallen back on the ideation system of the West to 
find a new legitimation for the reform process. Apartheid as a cruder form of 
Eurocentricism has been rejected even by the central areas of Eurocentric ideas. The 
cruder form of white superiority is being replaced by the ideas of reason, progress, 
science, the role of the individual and the importance of the market.
Formerly, the three pillars of legitimation of the system were based on white superiority 
and the separation of the races (saving white civilization in Africa), the defence of the 
strategic resources of the West and the fight against communism in Africa. These ideas 
became untenable as the basis for ideological hegemony and the challenge of 
dismantling apartheid is inscribed not only in empirically documenting the changes in
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the armed forces but also in dismantling the philosophical basis of ideological 
legitimation in South Africa.
The recourse to reforms and the search for more sophisticated forms of Eurocentrism 
as inscribed in the metaphysics of reason, the market and the progress of the individual 
is at variance with the forms of racial exclusion and domination of South Africa. The 
impending creation of a European Monetary System and the restructuring of the 
international economy sharpens the crisis for the form of governance in South Africa.
It was in this context of the changes in the international economy, the military defeat of 
the South Africans along with the mass democratic resistance which lent urgency to the 
dismantling of apartheid at both the philosophical and political level. However, for 
those with interests in the reproduction of capital, the dismantling involved the removal 
of the racial barriers to accumulation. This would also involve the removal of the racial 
barriers to military service in South Africa.
The political conjuncture pointed to many salient issues and the point of this paper is to 
attempt to explore the issues of reform or social transformation with particular reference 
to the future of militarization.' After 400years of slavery, colonialism and apartheid, the 
culture of violence and repression had made a definite impact on the forms of social 
reproduction. It sharpened the question of whether capitalism could survive in Southern 
Africa without force and violence. The militarization of the state and society had 
developed out of the central role of force and violence in social reproduction.
South African society is not only marked by the massive defence structure at the level 
of the coercive apparatus but at all levels. Private security firms, armed guards in the 
neighbourhoods of the rich and powerful, armed guards at the principal sites of 
economic reproduction, vigilantes and police violence in the black neighbourhoods 
along with the number of privately registered guns in South Africa pointed to the levels 
of militarization in that society. It was this level of force and repression which 
necessitated clarity and a long-term awareness of the imperatives of demilitarization in 
South Africa.
Franz Fanon, in analyzing the search for peace in another period of decolonization, saw 
the heed for the creation of a new society. In the context of the Algerian war of 
independence, Fanon had noted:
In the course o f the multiple episodes of war, the people came to realize that if they wished to bring a
new world with them they would have to create a new Algerian society from top to bottom.
The possibility of creating a new society from top to bottom in South Africa is oh the 
agenda. Already at the level of political mobilization those in combat have called for a 
non-racial democracy. The form and content of this democracy has yet to be articulated 
and one of the limits of the South African process has been the way that the intellectual 
culture has trailed the initiatives of those searching for a living wage, an end to racism 
and social emancipation. To be able to conceptualize a programme of change consistent 
with the aspirations of the producers has provided a major challenge to those with the 
resources to chart a political programme linked to demilitarization and conversion. 
Unfortunately in Africa, and in particular in South Africa, the exclusion of the African 
masses from the institutions of higher learning means that the intellectual culture is as 
impoverished as the conditions of the broad majority.
The study of war, militarism, security and strategic issues has been developed consistent 
with the centrality of force in the reproduction of apartheid. The alternative intellectual 
framework for the process of dismantling apartheid has been emerging out of the broad
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spectrum of anti-apartheid scholarship, which documented the impact of the regional 
destabilization and the defence expenditures of the South African state. This 
intellectual work provided a major advance beyond the modernization theories which 
spawned the study of the military in independent Africa and other parts of the 
underdeveloped world. It is in part the anti-apartheid scholarship along with the 
experiences and research agenda of the peace movements and the movement for nuclear 
disarmament, which provides a starting point for an analysis of the process of 
demilitarizing the South African state. This intellectual work is a vital component of 
the gigantic undertaking now underway to create a new society in South Africa beyond 
the agenda of the recomposition of capital inscribed in the reform agenda of the 
Nationalist Party.
The experiences of other African states and other oppressed societies which have 
engaged in armed struggle at once becomes pertinent. In the past, old ruling elements 
have sought to recoup through negotiations and reforms what they lost in battle. Under 
the umbrella of reforms, sections of South African capital are already calling for 
structural changes which would save the unequal distribution of wealth, preserve the 
present military industrial complex and recruit more Africans into the armed forces. 
The paper attempts to draw attention to the alternatives of dismantling the apartheid 
military structure by pointing to the links between militarism, force, industry, the labour 
process and social reproduction in South Africa. The whole structure of accumulation 
in South Africa shows that the system is in crisis and more profound changes are needed 
beyond the Africanization of the state.
Far from being seduced by the reform process, the demand for better housing, education 
for liberation and the dismantling of the coercive instruments has demonstrated that the 
removal of apartheid is not simply a juridical issue of pass laws, the Group Areas Act or 
population registration. The spirit of resistance has pointed to the search for new forms 
of economic organization and distribution of the social product. The translation of the 
spirit of resistance into concrete forms of popular power is part of the embryo of the 
project of establishing a non-racial democratic society after apartheid.
There are no models for this form of democracy, for the democracy of North America 
and Europe in the past 200 years was built on the exclusion of non-whites and imperial 
accumulation. Militarism and imperialism allowed for the kind of concessions to the 
working people of Europe which provided the basis for the social democratic 
compromise at the turn of the century. Warfare and capitalism generated a particular 
form of industrial organization. The South African variant of the military industrial 
complex involved close integration with the armaments culture in the West.
For this reason, the task of dismantling the apartheid war machine also calls into 
question the form of military structure required to defend African independence after 
apartheid. The forms of military organization open to a popular government in South 
Africa are considerable, given the depth of the contradictions of the present mode of 
social organization. Transitional forms of training and sources of military capital will 
be part of the process of dismantling the SADF if the new African leadership aim to 
break the integration of South Africa with the West. The possibility of a new form of 
military, economic and political integration in Southern Africa to meet the challenges 
of Europe after 1992 opens up vast alternatives for reconstruction and peace in Southern 
Africa.
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Such a possibility of African independence and integration of resources would inevitably 
invite hostile military acts; low-intensity warfare and other forms of economic 
destabilization. The experiences of IMF structural adjustment in the Eighties 
demonstrated that economic destabilization acted as a support system for the military 
destabilization of the South African army. The challenge of creating a new society from 
top to bottom will also require transformation of the forms of defence so that the African 
continent can be free from external economic manipulation.
A  slow but popularly based dismantling of the SADF could release major resources 
presently tied up by the military and unleash the potential of the producers in a manner 
that was not possible elsewhere in Africa during the period of decolonization. South 
Africa after apartheid could be the foundation for the process of change in Africa or the 
basis of the recomposition and reconstitution of capitalism in Africa. Unless clear ideas 
are marshalled on how to convert the military industrial complex, the outcome could be 
the integration of the liberation forces in the organs of destruction.
Whether this possibility exists will be dependent on the pace and intensity of the 
strengthening of the organs of popular power and a clear programme to break the 
centrality of force in production. The ideation system of market forces in South Africa 
never allowed free labour relations and the challenge will be whether this new society 
will be more concerned with the reproduction of capital or the social needs and the 
reproduction of human beings.
MILITARISM AND DEMILITARIZATION IN SOUTH AFRICA
The question posed by the political conjuncture of South Africa at the dawn of the 
Nineties was whether the study of militarism and security issues allowed and prepared 
the intellectuals for the challenges imposed by the military defeat of the South African 
armed forces. In classical political science the study of militarism has received some 
attention as the "process of militarization was consolidating itself in Africa". There has 
been some quantitative analysis on military spending, the size of the armed forces, the 
size and nature of military equipment, arms transfers and the defence capacity of 
particular states in Africa from specialized institutes such as the Stockholm International 
Peace Research Institute.2
This documentation has exposed how the trend in military expenditure has increased in 
the period of the debt crisis and hunger but in the main this information has been locked 
into the research fries of specialized institutes and its analytical usefulness for the 
political agenda of demilitarization has been limited. The South African generals and 
intellectuals at the Pretoria Institute of Strategic Studies found out the limited use of 
the facts on the defence capabilities or the wealth of South Africa in relation to the poor 
countries of the region of destabilization.
At the conceptual level the conception of militarism in South Africa and Southern Africa 
had to be linked to the way force and coercion dominated social intercourse. From the 
time of the imperialist partition of Africa, bonded labour, migrant labour, taxation, land 
alienation and low wages and discrimination were based on force. This force in the 
production led to the development of the military capacity of the SADF so that by the 
end of the Eighties the South African military was at the centre of economic planning, 
investment patterns and the use and misuse of resources all across the region.
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It is the understanding of the role of force in politics in Southern Africa which is at once 
necessary for challenging the new legitimation of reforms which calls for the centrality 
of market forces in South African society. The evolution of the myth of the market in 
Western Europe and North America was in the main tied to free labour relations. 
Labour was free in the double sense that it was free from the demands of daily 
subsistence and free to sell in the market place. The bantustans, pass laws, job 
reservation and the whole legal basis of apartheid was to prevent the development of 
free labour relations in South Africa. The military in South Africa developed not only 
to ensure that the producers were paid at a rate below the necessary requirement for 
subsistence but that the working people subsidized their own repression.
The super-exploitation of women in the reserves, the expansion of South African capital 
in the region of Southern Africa, and the barrack-like existence of the mining companies 
reinforced the culture of violence and oppression in South African society. The 
literature on war and defence expenditure has so far been unable to grasp this centrality 
of force and the absence of market forces. The empiricism and facts of defence budgets 
and size of troops has informed even those who attempt to document the effects of 
militarization in South African society.3 Ultimately this empiricism stems from the fact 
that the intellectuals documenting the process of militarization draw their intellectual 
inspiration from the same ideation system as that of the leaders of the state. The 
important difference lay in the crude forms of Eurocentricism of white superiority and 
that of economism, the ideas of progress, science, reason and the role of markets.
Small steps have been taken in Africa as a whole in exposing the impact of the ideation 
system of the West on Africa.4 The cultural clash between the reinforcement of this 
ideation system and the process of emancipationin Africa is at the core of a philosophical 
basis for the dismantling of apartheid. Essentially, the issue of demilitarization comes 
into contradiction with the modernization theories which have dominated the study of 
society in Africa. Modernization has been presented in both the guise of capitalist 
development and of socialist development. In South Africa this modernization is now 
being reformulated under the rubric of cultural pluralism, but one which accepts the 
culture of capital. In all cases this conception of modernization is based on the 
demobilization and depoliticization of those most capable of initiating a programme of 
demilitarization, the producers themselves.
Modernization theory which replaced the civilizing project of the missionaries after 
independence in Africa had ignored the concrete realities of exploitation and 
underdevelopment generated by external over-rule.5 With particular respect to the 
military, the modernizers saw the military as central to the process of modernization. 
The work of Pye, Huntington and Janowitz on "Armies in the Process of Militarization" 
has not found a place in the real world. Institutional analytical categories, questions of 
the military as a vehicle for acculturation and the military in the allocation of resources 
can shed light on the lopsided nature of the distribution of wealth but cannot penetrate 
the role of force in production.6
The study of the military in relation to the support of despotic (cultures and the search 
for democracy involves an appreciation of the place of militarism in Africa. Lenin, in 
his study of the military in Czarist Russia, pointed to the links between militarism and 
imperialism and to the fact that:
the bureaucracy and the standing army are a parasite on bourgeois society - a parasite created by the
internal antagonisms which rend that society, but a parasite which chokes all its vital organs.
5
In the study of the imperialist partition of the world at the turn of the century both Lenin 
and Rosa Luxemburg drew attention to the role of the military in the expansion of 
capital. In the particular context of Africa, Walter Rodney and W. E. B. DuBois paid 
close attention to the impact of the European military in the "Imperialist Partition of 
Africa If the military choked all the vital organs in society, in Africa it not only choked 
the vital organs, acted as a parasite but also as a source of destruction of the productive 
capacity and of human life. Von Clausewitz, the classical theoretician of war in Western 
Europe, helped to open one window of the understanding of militarism when he 
observed that war is the continuation of politics. If one accepts this interesting 
formulation, then one is at once caught in the historical analysis of industrial armies and 
the conjunctural crisis of the transcendence beyond the industrial model of the army. 
Mary Kaldor, in her excellent essay on "Warfare and Capitalism", pointed out how the 
modern army shared the same techniques of capitalist production and how warfare 
became capital-intensive.8 The modern army employed the management techniques of 
the large corporation and such techniques were inscribed in the management system of 
the defence infrastructure in South Africa.
If the industrial army was the correlate of the industrial society, then there are profound 
questions on the nature of the organization of the armed forces beyond the era of 
Fordism and Taylorism. The changes in the organic composition of capital and the 
restructuring of capital internationally have made the forms of military intervention 
since World War 2 obsolete to the point that the principal military strategists of the West 
are codifying the principles of low-intensity warfare.9 The shift from military assistance 
programmes to military civic action by the Pentagon in Africa has already pointed to the 
preparations for the new forms of military intervention when the United States will have 
to demobilize its troops from Europe after 1992.
The intellectual challenges posed for a programme of demilitarization in Southern 
Africa demand that if one fell back on Clausewitz’s formulation one is attempting to 
understand war not only as a continuation of politics, but how to conceptualize politics 
without war. This is the task of the intellectual transformation which is linked to the 
cultural transformation which is going on in Southern Africa. The removal of the 
Nationalist government in Pretoria and the dismantling of the SADF is one of the 
short-term requirements needed to sharpen the democratic alternatives.
The military defeat of the South Africans posed questions either for the profound 
transformations beyond force in production or the recomposition of the system without 
the racial barriers to accumulation. The intellectual poverty of the modernization 
theories (whether formulated in the creation of African entrepreneurs or in the 
development of the productive forces) has failed to grasp the cultural clash between 
African labour and capital within which the militarization and destabilization of the 
region of Southern Africa was inscribed. The analysis of the objective factors of the 
SADF acts as a starting point for helping to clarify the contradictions of the system and 
how the producers were called upon to subsidize their own repression. The militaiy 
defeat of the South Africans at Cuito Cuanavale clarified the limits of the modernization 
programme of the SADF. The literature on the SADF emanating from the books 
produced by the psychological war section of the SADF has shed some light on the 
weapons systems and the number of persons under arms.10 This military information 
came up against the problem of the loss of legitimation of the armed forces. No society 
rules by force only. There must be a coherent ideology to motivate those who carry arms 
to defend the state. The ideology of white superiority, of strategic minerals and of
6
anti-communism has failed to legitimate the system, hence the haste for reforms and 
negotiations before the disintegration of the armed forces.
Cuito Cuanavale marked the end of a flawed perception of 'Total Strategy". In 1977 
when the defence White Paper had articulated this idea to defend the system, the 
defence planners had argued that:
The defence of the Republic of South Africa is not solely the responsibility of the Department of
Defence. On the contrary, the maintenance o f the sovereignty is the combined responsibility of all
government departm ents.... The aspects o f national security which require attention oh an
interdepartmental basis are the following:
•  Political action
•  Military/paramilitary action
•  Economic action
•  Psychological action
•  Scientific and technological action
•  Religious-cultural action
•  Manpower services
•  Intelligence services
•  Security services
•  National supplies, resources and production services
•  Transport and distribution services
•  Community services
•  Telecommunication services
Together the above fields cover the whole spectrum of National Security.11
It is this conception that national security covers the whole spectrum of social 
reproduction that sharpens the need for a philosophical framework for the dismantling 
of the war machine and the conversion of the military industrial complex. Psychological 
warfare and disinformation, which are part and parcel of the reform/negotiations 
process, were conceptualized within the framework of national security. The question 
posed by the historic conjuncture was whether the intellectual intervention necessary 
for negotiations would be consistent with the need for more profound changes in the 
society than simple elevation of an African to be the commander-in-chief of the armed 
forces. It is within this divide between the scholarship for reforms and the intellectual 
transformation necessary for social justice that the discussion of demilitarization and 
conversion is inscribed. In essence, the question of demilitarization is not only a 
technical/military one, but profoundly a political question, based on the balance of 
forces. In the short run, one has to fall back on the empirical work on the size of the 
armed forces and the proportion of the budget spent on defence to illuminate the 
contradictions of the apartheid war machine and how the people were subsidizing their 
own repression.
THE CONTRADICTIONS OF THE APARTHEID WAR MACHINE.
The published literature on the organization and structure of the SADF has shown 
clearly the way in which the conception of Total National Strategy integrated the military 
in all sectors of the state. This literature has illuminated the size, composition and the 
external linkages of the SADF in the destructive war which was unleashed across South
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Africa and Southern Africa.12 The SADF proper is divided into four principal arms: 
the army, the navy, the airforce and the medical services.
Through interlocking committees such as the Joint Management Committees (now 
called Local Coordinating Councils) and death squads (such as the Civil Cooperation 
Bureau), the top echelons of the military were linked to the day-to-day policing of the 
society along with the administrative structures of apartheid. At the apex of this system 
was the Department of Defence and Armaments Supply. Before the defeat at Cuito 
Cuanavale and the reform guise, this militarism coordinated all the politics of the society 
through the State Security Council.
The South African military structure emerged out of the traditions of European 
militarism and attempted to legitimate itself in society with the same ideas as the 
militarists in Western Europe and North America. The continuity in the form and 
structure of the armed forces can be seen in the way in which the South African soldier 
is subordinate to the weapons system. Of the armed forces, the South African army is 
still the largest with over 80 percent of the total men and women under arms. In this 
army the brigade structure is organized around the concept of the "mechanized 
battlefield" with a vast array of tanks, armoured cars, personnel carriers and heavy 
artillery designed not for defensive purposes but for offensive warfare. This mechanized 
army is integrated into an airforce which boasted over 250 combat aircraft in a number 
of squadrons. Behind this army and the airforce lagged the navy with obsolete patrol 
boats, frigates and submarines. This whole armed structure is very capital intensive, with 
vast sums being poured into the domestic arms industry as a prop to local capitalism. 
The military budget reflects the links between capital accumulation, military aggression, 
the depression of the real wage and the reproduction of the system.
In this capital-intensive and socially destructive military system the soldier is defined in 
relation to weapons. Kaldor in her work has shed light on the concept of the weapons 
system which combines a weapons platform (ship, aircraft or tank, gun, missile or 
torpedo); and the means of command and communication. The South African state is 
organized around the conception of the weapons system of the West and this ensured 
that the imperatives of the linkages to the armaments industry of the industrial complex 
of the North meant that there was consistent military collaboration between the 
manufacturers of weapons in the West and the Armaments Corporation in South 
Africa.14
The drive for technological improvement and the absolute destructive power which has 
been justified in NATO by the jargon of the "strategic edge" found its place in South 
Africa with the attempt of the regime to develop nuclear weapons. This push to develop 
nuclear weapons in a society where the majority went without the basic needs or running 
water distinguished the nature of militarism in South Africa where the apartheid regime 
initiated a military technological infrastructure in an effort to generalize the 
development of the modem skills of military science in the society. Hence today the 
SADF embraces the entire political economy of the society in that the missiles and 
armoured cars are assembled in factories by oppressed workers while the soldiers are 
trained to use these weapons on the very same workers and their children. This sharpens 
the contradiction embedded in the centrality of force in production.
In the advanced capitalist countries where the concept of the weapons platform and the 
capital-intensive army developed there was the development of free labour relations 
and the workers were in the main able to organize in trade unions and to participate in
8
the limited democracy of Voting every five years. There was also a spin-off of consumer 
items from the factories of military production, for the state had to take care of the 
subsistence needs of the working people. In these societies the surpluses earned from 
international accumulation and imperial domination by finance capital allowed the state 
to integrate the producers as citizens with basic democratic rights. The working people 
as a whole could be persuaded to kill or risk getting killed in the "national interest". This 
worker volunteered for military service and allowed part of his or her taxes to support 
military expansion.
This form of ideological reproduction served to reproduce the social system, for the 
forms of the subordination of labour ensured the dominance of ideological forms of 
domination over the direct use of force on a day-to-day basis. In South Africa the state 
cannot mobilize the majority of the working people on the emotive appeals to loyalty, 
patriotism and anti-communism. The SADF is maintained as a modern, mechanized 
army primarily through its technological, economic and political links with the West.
The capital intensity of the SADF inscribed within the contradictions between force on 
a day-to-day basis and ideological reproduction intensified with every major rebellion 
by the working people. Following the massive rebellions of Soweto in 1976 the South 
African capitalist class were mobilized to respond to the needs of militarization. The 
impact of the independence of Mozambique and Angola and the students’ resistance 
sharpened the alliance between capital and coercion, for the nature of South African 
capital needed to expand in the regions which were now becoming independent.
The interconnections between the industrial magnates, mining and bank capital helped 
to define the nature of industrial development in South Africa. Guided by the 
requirements of force and compulsion on a day-to-day basis, capital and the military 
espoused the mythical 'Total Strategy" which incorporated the concept of a regional 
security and economic zone for South African capital. The bantustan strategy of the 
state met both the requirements of cheap bonded labour and the kind of industrialization 
carried out to build up an armaments sector in the economy. Segregation, cheap labour 
and high profits strengthened the pace of industrial accumulation, but within this 
material transformation lay a greater contradiction. The narrow domestic market meant 
that the whole sub-continent was viewed as the region for the expansion of South African
African capital and military destabilization and destruction was a logical outcome of this 
process.
Yet the rigidity of the forms of governance and the coercive instruments developed in
society. The crude conception of racial superiority/inferiority meant that the resultant 
form of industrialization was not based on a pool of skilled local labour but was 
dependent on a constant supply of skilled labour from Europe. The high standard of 
living guaranteed by the system of racial segregation ensured a flow of European 
technicians, but this could not make up for the fundamental contradiction of the skills 
shortage.
More significantly African labour could not be totally suppressed and denied a living 
wage. Inevitably, the occupation of the townships and the subsequent repression could 
not contain the organization of the working people. Throughout the period from 
articulation of the principles of apartheid there was spontaneous and organized 
rebellion. From the formation of the African National Congress in 1912 to the
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formation of the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) in 1985 the 
self-organization of the African people expressed itself in a clear manner to challenge 
the system. The reform process pointed to the failure of force and militarism to crush 
the liberation movements and the mass democratic resistance. The challenge before 
the state and the forces in combat was whether the experiences of Kenya and Zimbabwe 
could be implemented in a situation where the freedom fighters were integrated in the 
armed forces to repress the working people. It was this challenge along with the 
subsidies of the working people to their own repression which demanded a clear 
programme for dismantling apartheid as a component of the negotiations.
The Subsidies of the Working People to Capital
As the organization of the working people developed in South Africa and a 
corresponding intellectual culture is harnessed it will be more possible to quantify the 
full extent of the depression of the social wage. Because of the day-to-day military 
occupation of black neighbourhoods and repression, the arms produced by the workers 
in the factories oiARM SCOR  are being used against the very same workers. The extent 
of the subsidy of the worker to his own repression cannot yet be measured with accuracy 
for there is still secrecy surrounding the full extent of military expenditure. Yet from 
the published facts some extent of the subsidy can be seen in the relation of social 
expenditures to military expenditures. The social wage of the African workers is 
depressed so that the state can maintain and replenish the coercive apparatus.
This situation can be compared to the production of armaments in the advanced 
capitalist countries where the changing organic composition of capital led to 
commensurate changes in the skill, knowledge and organizational capacities of the 
working class. Hence the process of militarization was effected by mobilizing the 
political support of the dominated classes. This was done through major concessions to 
the working people such as the redistribution of income, trade union rights, the right to 
the franchise, subsidized housing and education, pensions, technical education and those 
elements of rule which have come to be associated with a free enterprise economy. 
These concessions have allowed for the basis of ideological coercion so that the workers 
in the capitalist states have been willing to fight for and to defend capitalism. South 
African workers are super-exploited, their families dumped in unhealthy reservations 
called bantustans and the surpluses from their labour fuel the drive for militarization. 
This is reflected in the expenditures on defence.
Defence Expenditure in South Africa
The total military expenditure of the South African state is difficult to measurebecause 
security is broadly defined in the context of the Total National Strategy. All the 
authorities which seek to detail the problem of defence expenditures highlight the fact 
that security expenditures in South Africa are difficult to measure because expenditures 
on defence - including police, intelligence, paramilitary, Civil Cooperation Bureau and 
external destabilization - are significantly higher than the published estimates of military 
spending.
In the 15-year period since the first defeat of the South Africans in Angola and the 
Soweto uprisings, official defence spending in South Africa has increased by over 500
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percent. By 1990-1991 the official defence budget had reached RIO,3 billion- and as a 
sop to the reform process R2 billion was allocated for the improvement of conditions 
of the Africans. The official defence budget grew from R4,3 billion in 1985/86 to R5,l 
billion in 1986/87, R6,6 billion in 1987/88, R8,2 billion in 1988/89, RIO,3 billion in 
1989/90 and the same amount of RIO,3 billion in 1990/91. These figures by themselves 
show the tremendous resources which went into the department of destruction and yet 
this does not tell the whole story.
The increased defence expenditure after the military defeat in Angola and the 
withdrawal from Namibia demonstrated that the reform process did not overtly include 
a programme of demilitarization. Comparisons are immediately made on the amount 
spent on education, housing, health and other forms of social reproduction as opposed 
to the military. Sensitive to this comparison, the psychological and deceptive Impulse 
of National Strategy published the budget figures to show that spending on education 
had surpassed spending on defence.16
This kind of deception will guide the reform process, for the state cannot easily reveal 
the full extent of militarization though newspaper accounts of the budget in South Africa 
now include justice, police and defence under "Protection Services". With the 
manipulation of figures the state then proclaimed that there was a decrease in defence 
expenditure despite the big jump of over R2,2 billion spent on defence since the need 
to refurbish the airforce after the defeat at Tchipa in 1988. The fact which has been 
documented by numerous sources is that the defence and military expenditure has 
continued to rise. Despite the information now provided to link justice and police to 
"Protection Services" this information still excludes:
•  The amount spent on defence buildings and property, for the Department of 
Public Works pays for the construction of military bases.
•  The amount spent on the five different intelligence services.
•  Defence and police expenditures in the so- called bantustans which is financed 
through the Foreign Affairs vote.
•  The resources diverted to the Atomic Energy Commission for the 
development of nuclear weapons, and other funds for the Strategic Fuel Fund.
•  The direct subsidies to ARMSCOR which is justified on the grounds of 
modernizing the weapons system; and
•  The costs of reintegrating the South West Africa Territorial Force into the new 
bases.
When all these figures are added, the total outlay for repression in South Africa 
represents over R20 billion or over 25 percent of the budgeted expenditure.17 This fact 
alone demonstrates the need to divert the resources used for coercion to housing, 
education and social services. But the disenfranchisement of the large majority ensures 
that they are still called upon to subsidize their own poverty.
One important question which is usually posed theoretically from the fact that defence 
expenditure was over a quarter of total government expenditure and 7,8 percent of the 
Gross Domestic Product was: Did militarism in South Africa create the conditions for 
industrial production and create accumulation? This borrowing from the debates in 
Europe on military expenditure and capitalism ignores the concrete reality of the
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destructive effects of militarization which have been documented by United Nations 
agencies such as UNICEF.
The empirical accounts of the defence expenditure can, however, act as an important 
starting point for the political intervention to dismantle the system of repression. The 
broader theoretical point, however, is that the military industrial complex subsists in an 
Economy and in a region where the wage rate is lowered beneath the physical capacity 
of reproduction for the workers. Moreover, in the words of one study, "Modern military 
technology is not advanced, it is decadent".18 Notwithstanding this decadence, however, 
the SADF has unleashed terror in Africa.
The relevant point for this analysis is to, however, point to the fact that despite the boasts 
of the spokespersons for ARMSCOR the licensing arrangements and reliance on 
foreign imports create the conditions for direct military intervention and/or 
collaboration with the West. For these reasons all the major Western countries colluded 
to break the UN arms embargo against South Africa and are urging a reform strategy 
which integrates the liberation movements into this decadent military industrial 
complex.
As the crude forms of coercion are being replaced by the need for the integration of a 
stratum of Africans in the state apparatus there is talk of the need for free enterprise. 
Under state protection South African capital was never exposed to real competition and 
the effect of the political hegemony of the ruling class had generated monopoly 
conditions. This concentration and centralization presented major problems in the 
period of reform for the degree of monopolization meant that the shift from monopoly 
militaristic control to one guided by even the principles of bourgeois democracy could 
lead to political changes which could have a positive effect on the new forms of economic 
activity after apartheid.
For this reason those who benefited from force and monopoly conditions for the past 
five decades now call for the privatization of industry. Faced with the potential for 
economic independence by an African government, the language of the market and 
liberalization are now being invoked to halt the empowerment of the majority. A  false 
dichotomy between free enterprise and nationalization is being created to divert 
attention from the military expenditure and the violence which is generated by this 
imperative.
The debate bn privatization is also part of the thrust to open up the economy so that 
certain Africans can be made to feel that they have a stake in defending the present form 
of governance. This would then provide for the release of white labour from the military 
to be available for industry. The integration of large numbers of Africans into the 
military which had been the object of the programme called "Reform" and the new 
constitutional dispensation in 1983 has so far been implemented under the homelands 
policy. At the core of the present reform strategy is the concern to maintain the present 
military industrial complex, release white labour for industry while recruiting large 
numbers of Africans into the armed forces. This strategy would then make the liberation 
movement an. ally of capital better able to legitimately repress the organized working 
class. This then would solve the problem of international isolation and better able South 




THE NEED TO BRING AFRICANS INTO THE ARMED FORCES
The totality of the crisis for apartheid brought about the present conjuncture where 
negotiations between the African National Congress and the Nationalist Party are now 
possible. The political and economic crisis had forced the oppressed to register their 
opposition in the factories, in their communities, in the schools in the fight against the 
SADF in the townships and in the resistance in the Frontline States. The state had to 
resort to more and more force and this very process led to its international isolation. 
Four factors brought the capitalist class in South Africa to the point of negotiations. 
These were:
•  The military defeat of the army in Angola and the threatened disintegration of 
the armed forces.
•  The massive defiance campaign of the mass democratic organs.
•  The international campaign for sanctions and disinvestment; and
•  The political, diplomatic and military struggles of the liberation movements.
Neither covert nor overt Western military support could solve the contradictions of the 
society. Once the South African economy was based on force and racism and at the same 
time the military was based on the principle of the mechanized; battlefield the SADF 
needed the complete mobilization of its citizens. In the absence of the majority support, 
the humanpower requirements of the SADF had a negative effect on industry, the 
military and the accumulation of capital. This crisis is already evident in a society where 
there is a shortage of skilled labour for industry in a situation of high unemployment for 
the African majority.
For a long time job reservation excluded black workers from higher skilled jobs and the 
military machine enmeshes every white male in some form of military service from the 
age of 18 to 55. With the addition of the various police and armed administrative 
functionaries, up to 25 percent of the active white male population is directly under arms 
to defend apartheid. And the integration of this defence apparatus into European 
capital meant that 33 percent of the SADF were Europeans (British, Portuguese, Dutch, 
Germans, etc).
Various sources, including the Military Balance (produced by the International Institute 
for Strategic Studies in London) estimated the total mobilizable force in South Africa 
to be oyer 404 000, with a standing force o f83 400which included over 53 000 conscripts. 
Other sources, especially from the anti-apartheid institutes, tallied the total mobilizable 
strength of the SADF to be over 639 000 with a standing force of 178 000 (including the 
bantustan forces and the returned elements from the South West Africa Territorial 
Force). With the addition of the various police forces the total strength of the apartheid 
armed machine to be dismantled can be calculated at over 755 000. No society with 4,5 
million whites could continuously sustain an armed force of this size when the majority 
of the population was in rebellion and the liberation forces were committed to armed 
struggle to remove apartheid. The attempts to rationalize the competing demands of 
industry and the military meant that more white women were integrated into the armed 
forces.
The pressures for bringing Africans into the armed forces had guided the reform strategy 
since 1983 but this was checked by the popular uprisings. The constitutional changes
13
proffered since that time have as a central aim the solution of the shortage of 
humanpower so that more Africans can join the armed forces and that conscription of 
white youth could end. However, the in-built racism of the system acted as a disincentive 
for the integration of large numbers of Africans into the armed forces. At the end of 
1986, after massive recruitment drives, the SADF comprised of 76 percent whites, 12 
percent Africans, 11 percent Coloureds and 1 percent Indians.
Two other factors compound this crisis for the state. Firstly, the cost of conscription led 
to a sharp debate by the capitalist class. This class, which sees the militancy of the African 
workers organized in COSATU, calls for a smaller, more effective volunteer army 
"which would pack more punch and certainly be less costly". The other more serious 
fact has been die deligitimizing of the macho image of the state by the End Conscription 
Campaign. The fact that large numbers of whites both overtly and covertly now refuse 
to serve in the armed forces threatens the future of the state. It reinforces all the 
contradictions of the system, and the rush for negotiations is to ensure that young whites 
do not cross over to the African National Congress in large numbers with their guns. It 
is partly to prevent this disintegration of the system that there is an urgency behind the 
negotiation process.
Experience elsewhere in Africa, most recently in Zimbabwe and Namibia, 
demonstrated that the liberation movement can be tamed by the integration of former 
guerillas into the old coercive apparatus. The key was to ensure that the questions of 
logistics, training, technical competence in the development of missiles and other issues 
were kept out of the hands of the African officer corps. There have been numerous 
examples in history where the bottom of the army was racially distinct from the top and 
the troops were basically cannon fodder. The French deepened this model in World 
War 1.
Racism and bigotry which had sustained the idea of apartheid since 1948 meant that the 
Nationalist Party had recoiled from the idea of arming Africans. This historical fact was 
grasped by none other than the same George Orwell who grasped the essence of thought 
control and psychological warfare. He had observed that:
There is one thought which every white man thinks when he sees a black army marching past. How 
much longer can we go on kidding these people? How long before they turn their guns in the other 
direction?22
Though this fear continues to permeate the reformers, the limited experience of 
low-intensity war and turning Africans against Africans as in the case of Jonas Savimbi 
in Angola and the MNR in Mozambique meant that new techniques of drugs and 
thought control can be mobilized to deal with the integration of Africans into the armed 
forces as long as they are depoliticized. (Kenneth Grundy in his book, Soldiers Without. 
Politics: Blacks in the South African Armed Forces, has documented the contradictory 
nature of the place of the Africans in the armed forces.)
In the new conditions where there are different conceptions of the dismantling of 
apartheid, a careful study of the decolonization policies of the British with respect to 
the former colonial armies can illustrate how previously radical nationalists were 
socialised in Western military academies to ensure that Africa remained within the 
military culture of the industrialized North. This included the acquisition of weapons 
from the socialist states, for this form of training reinforced the lopsided dependence 
which has characterized the continent since independence.
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The South African crisis pointed to either learning the lessons of the integration of the 
freedom fighters into the old coercive apparatus or to a more profound dismantling of 
the system of force including the conversion of the military industrial complex.
THE PROBLEMS OF CONVERSION OF THE MILITARY INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX
The kind of politicization of the liberation army of South Africa will be an important 
aspect of the restructuring of the South African economy after apartheid. Nelson 
Mandela on his release from 27 years of incarceration echoed the major demand of 
liberation when he said in his speech in Cape Town:
There must be an end to white monopoly on political power and a fundamental restructuring of our 
political and and economic system to ensure that the inequalities of apartheid are addressed and our 
society thoroughly democratized.
This demand for the restructuring of the economy to meet the needs of democratization 
of the political process strikes at the very essence of the industrial organization to 
implement a programme of conversion to reorient the vast resources now deployed into 
ARMSCOR.
ARMSCOR is central to the subsidies provided by the working people to reinforce their 
own repression. Through the integration of the military and industry, the state grants 
subsidies to local capitalists to maintain a certain level of industrial activity. This 
industrial activity is a necessary logistic component of the mechanized army. 
ARMSCOR is one of the largest industrial concerns in South Africa with assets of close 
to R2 billion.23
Despite the secrecy which surrounds the procurement and production of aiins in South 
Africa the reality is that ARMSCOR consumes resources that could be used to 
accelerate social development and economic reconstruction. And one of the immediate 
requirements of the dismantling of apartheid will be the democratization of information 
so that elected members and the working people can know what proportion of the budget 
is allocated to the production of weapons.
The published records of the government’s own White Paper on Defence and 
Armaments Procurement can be an important starting point for pinpointing the areas 
of immediate conversion and those areas of a more long-term restructuring. A  major 
state corporation with over nine subsidiaries and over 800 sub-contractors, this sector 
of the economy is one area where there can be a start to deal with what is produced, for 
whom, the impact on the environment and to chart a course for the empowerment of 
the working people in the society.
This restructuring is also necessary to break the technological dependence of South 
Africa on the outdated military technology of the West. For behind the metal factories, 
engineering works and aircraft assembly factories lay the fact that ARMSCOR was 
integrated into a licensing arrangement with Western arms manufacturers and did not 
engender a local scientific and technological capacity. Many critical assessments of 
ARMSCOR by anti-apartheid scholars and those involved in the disinvestment 
campaign have pointed to this technological dependence. While South African state 
intellectuals have attempted to sell the myth of military self-sufficiency as part of the 
psychological war against the Frontline States, they have been forced to decry the aged 
nature of the military equipment of the airforce and the navy, This shortcoming was 
most evident in Angola when the S ADF tried to fight air and land battles but lost control
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of the air. The South African economy does not have the expertise to design, develop 
and build sophisticated aircraft engines. Even in Western Europe the efforts to build 
modern jet fighters to compete with the US aerospace industry involved multi-national 
cooperation within the EEC.
ARMSCOR Was essentially an assembly point for the prime contractors of armaments 
in the West and this state-controlled corporation in turn became the pivot for local 
subsidiaries to take over some arms production and to build the nuts and bolts. It is the 
conversion of this armaments corporation from building jets, armoured vehicles, guided 
missiles, warships and chemical weapons to building schools, houses and water supply 
systems and new techniques to tackle tsetse fly and bilharzia which will be the decisive 
test of whether the society is on the road to profound transformations or simply the 
integration of Africans into the bureaucratic apparatus.
The intellectual work and the research agenda for disarmament and conversion in South 
Africa goes beyond the advocacy work of the sanctions campaign, yet at the same time 
builds on the resources unleashed for the international anti-apartheid campaign so that 
there is a place for international intellectual involvement to support the programme of 
economic conversion in South Africa. A  major advance has already been made in 
Western Europe where the debate on conversion has been very well organized and 
linked to the call for the withdrawal of United States forces from Europe.
This discussion of demilitarization and conversion was not on the agenda of the 
international campaign for sactions. There is also an important difference between the 
conversion studies in Western Europe and North America and Western Europe and 
South Africa in that there is a politicized and conscious working class which could 
provide the political pressure necessary for conversion.
The political education of the working people for the programme of economic 
conversion becomes essential, for even the militarists of South Africa had seen the 
international campaign for disarmament and had itemised sector by sector the products 
developed and produced by ARMSCOR, the description of military outputs and the 
commercial applications. This foresight of the more perceptive elements from among 
the militarists corresponds to the embrace of disarmament by certain leaders of Western 
Europe to steal the thunder from the popularly based campaign for nuclear 
disarmament.
A  programme of economic conversion requires, firstly, the democratization of 
information on defence contractors, their capacity for production of weapons and the 
amount of subsidies provided. In this area the published studies such as that of SIPRI 
entitled Embargo Disimplemented can be an im portant starting point for an 
industry-by-industry breakdown and the relevant production capacity. This work will in 
the short run necessitate cooperation with the United Nations Disarmament 
Commission which could provide some of the expertise to plan a detailed conversion of 
the military industrial complex.
In the process there are key areas of immediate action.
At the outset to stop the subsidy from labour to capital there would be the immediate 
reduction of the military budget This reduction in the budget would be a corollary of 
the withdrawal of troops from the townships, the removal of support for low-intensity 
war in Mozambique and Angola and the demobilization of all forces organized to carry 
out counter-insurgency operations. To be able in the short run to develop a cadre of
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African scientists and engineers to guide this process of conversion some of the 
resources removed from the military budget would be needed for an accelerated 
programme of training engineers and managers to retool the present factories to 
increase goods for civilian use at the expense of military production. And in order that 
this process does not develop as a bureaucratic alternative, the requirement would be 
for the development of the programme of conversion within the on-going discussion in 
the mass democratic and trade union movements to develop Alternative Use 
Committees.26 The structures already developed within the ranks of the trade union 
movement, especially the Engineering Workers’ Union, would be essential for this 
process.
A  programme of conversion is a long-term task which would distinguish the tasks of 
emancipation of the liberation movements from the reform programme for the 
recomposition of capital. The democratization of information from the outset and the 
involvement of the organs of the Mass Democratic Movement would be a concrete step 
towards the empowerment of the workers to not only deepen the concept of industrial 
democracy but clean up the environment, provide jobs and new skills and build roads, 
bridges, water supply and sewer systems.
In the teeth of the repression and occupation of the townships small steps were made in 
the direction of popular democratic debates. The involvement of the communities in 
the discussions of stayaways, rent boycotts and educational protests can be the new 
vehicles for the restructuring and reorganization of communities to break down the 
social divisions which supported apartheid. These democratic organs would be the basis 
for prioritizing the options of conversion from military use to civilian use. Local 
community input along with clear planning by the state would be a concrete step to deal 
with the myriad of social problems bequeathed by the system of apartheid.
The legacies of shanties, bantustans, poor sanitation and the poor education for Africans 
will be inherited by any government after apartheid. South African society has an urgent 
need for housing, equal education for all, health care, proper transportation, sanitation, 
clean running water and the recovery of the natural environment. Environmental repair 
in South Africa cannot focus simply on the natural environment but also on the waste 
of human resources by apartheid. To deepen the understanding that apartheid is a 
problem of the environment, drastic measures will be needed to determine that the 
worth of human beings should be equal regardless of race.
Along with the environment defined in terms of human beings is the question of the 
clean-up of the squatter areas and the break-up of the land policies which placed the 
majority of the population on 13 percent of the land. The land question in South Africa 
is not simply a return of the land to the tiller but also the relations of production to be 
developed and the linkages between agriculture and industry in the post-apartheid 
society. African women in South Africa have a fundamental interest in the issue of 
conversion and the land question, for the system of apartheid and migrant labour had a 
debilitating effect on the African family. It was the woman who was left in the reserves, 
who subsidised capital and who bore the brunt of the pain in the absence of health, 
education, water supplies and affordable electricity. ,
These questions should be linked to the broader restructuring that should be needed 
for the restructuring and reconstruction of the region of Southern Africa.
Engineers and scientists who are presently deployed to research the development of 
missiles and nuclear weapons will have to be re-educated to build bridges, transportation
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systems, houses, new communities for workers in the mines who live with their families 
and carefully designed hydrological systems to deal with the cycle of flood and drought 
in the region. The repeal of the Group Areas Act and other legal means of repression 
will in the long run be meaningless unless there are resources for the building of new 
communities.
It was the shortsighted nature of racism which held back the full potential of the South 
African economy and the distortions in the region of Southern Africa. A  massive 
construction programme to re-house millions would not only provide a boost for the 
whole region, deal with the problems of unemployment and at the same time provide 
the basis for a closer integration of the region of Southern Africa based on real 
cooperation and reversing domination and destabilization. In this sense the problem of 
the programme of conversion stands in the divide between a demand for reparations or 
closer integration of the region.
Because of the over US$70 billion damage unleashed by the South African defence 
forces over the past 10 years there will be voices in the Frontline States calling for 
reparations and for the renegotiation of the unequal distribution of resources. (The 
many dams in the region, from Ruacana in Angola to Cabora Bassa in Mozambique to 
the Lesotho Highlands Water Project, highlight the inequality of countries providing 
electrical power for South African industry when their own citizens have very little 
electrical energy.) A  carefully conceived programme of conversion can build on the 
elementary cooperation which was developed in the period of the liberation struggle to 
lay the basis for more long-term forms of political cooperation without foreign aid.
This form of cooperation will be sharpened as the integration of Europe and the 
centralization and concentration of capital in Europe challenges Africa with new forms 
of domination for the 21st Century.
The struggle beyond the ideation system of Europe will be a long-term issue. In 
Southern Africa the contradiction of Europe and Africa led to an armed clash over the 
past 100 years and the present political conjuncture contains the seeds of sharp 
alternatives not only for Africa but for humanity in the question of developing forms of 
social intercourse beyond the ideas of racial superiority/inferiority.
This struggle has to tackle the fundamental myth of progress and science which deployed 
resources in South Africa for the building of nuclear weapons. Central to the 
restructuring of the region of Southern Africa will be a unilateral freeze on the 
development of nuclear weapons and the renouncing of the future use of such weapons. 
Any such declaration will invite hostile acts from those dependent on the mineral 
resources of Southern Africa for the building of nuclear weapons.
This fact also sharpens not only the need for political cooperation but in the very process 
of dismantling the apartheid military industrial complex develop a military 
infrastructure which could repulse hostile invasions. South Africa will be faced with the 
need to build a people’s army after apartheid, one which can guard against external 
aggression after liberation. Here the recent experiences of other peoples fighting 
against external domination will be relevant. The Cuban society was able to develop 
the concept of the civic soldier who was both capable of defending the community while 
capable of handling sophisticated weaponry. This experience plus the fact that these 
people assisted in the military defeat of the South African armed forces at Cuito 
Cuanavale can provide many salient lessons for the development of a new army where 
the soldier is not merely a cog in a mechanized weapons platform.
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The politics of disarmament in South Africa is interwoven with major changes in the 
international system. Massive uprisings in Eastern Europe and the search for 
democratic participation in Africa beyond the debt crisis and structural adjustment 
sharpens the alternatives for Africa and South Africa. The liberation process in South 
Africa and Southern Africa benefits from the positive and negative experiences of Africa 
over the past 30 years. The organizational transformation of the forces in combat in 
South Africa has reinforced the other major political changes in the society.
The material transformation of the society can be measured with reference to the 
empirical information on the place of manufacturing and new industries in South Africa. 
Along with this m aterial transform ation has been the transform ation of the 
consciousness of the youth in the society to stand up and fight. This transformation in 
the political consciousness has affected all popular groups in the students’ movement, 
in the workers’ movement, in the church, the mosque, the school and the communities. 
This transformation of the organization and consciousness has not been matched by 
political and more profoundly cultural transformations. It is at this level that those who 
are retooling the system have embarked on a major cultural assault to save the system.
The dismantling of the intelligence organs of repression will be the hardest in South 
Africa. For in the period of repression the intelligence-gathering bodies were directly 
linked to the institutions of higher learning. It was not coincidental that the head of the 
National Intelligence Service in South Africa was a University professor. The ideas and 
research agenda of the SADF drew heavily from the institutions of higher learning. In 
this rearguard action to change the system through reforms the techniques of 
low-intensity warfare are being studied.
At the same time the integration of the intelligence services of the Sotith Africans with 
those of Britain and the USA meant that they were also integrated into the psychological 
warfare and disinformation activities of the South African state. The present intense 
cultural assault through films, books, theatre, sports and television to sell the success of 
capitalism along with the reform process points to the tremendous tasks ahead in 
breaking the intelligence-gathering capabilities of the state. African culture, which 
acted as the basis for the resistance of the Mass Democratic Movement, remains a major 
source of untapped energy to break the present campaign of psychological warfare. Yet 
because the progressive forces have turned their backs on this weapon the South African 
state has been seeking to mobilize the negative effects of the politicization of ethnicity 
to create havoc and divisions. The violence in Natal along with the cheap deniable war 
unleashed by the MNR is only one indication of the potentialities of the dying system.
CONCLUSION
The debate and discussion on the dismantling of the apartheid war machine is taking 
place at a time when Africa is on the threshold of a tremendous breakthrough beyond 
external domination. Apartheid blocked the social and cultural development of the 
African people not only in South Africa, in the destabilized Frontline States but on the 
continent as a whole. The persistence of force and coercion in the reproduction of the 
system led to war and militarism. But Africans proved able to organize to defend and 
militarily defeat the apartheid war machine.
The generals of the SADF and the defence planners had come to believe their own 
disinformation to the point that the fetishism of the weapons system was equated with
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the fetishism of white superiority. Militarily defeated, internationally isolated and faced 
with the organized working people, the Nationalist Party leadership along with elements 
of international capital orchestrated a reform process to integrate elements of the armed 
liberation movements into the present military set-up.
The emergence of street committees, people’s courts, popular forms of defence and 
other grassroots forms of governance had made the system ungovernable. This crisis 
lent more weight to the role offeree, and the greater the deployment of force the greater 
the international call for the isolation of apartheid. This international isolation created 
major problems for a ruling class which was integrated into the financial and 
technological basis of Western capital since the era of colonialism.
The political organization of the oppressed in South Africa created the embryo of a new 
popular state after apartheid. This political organization eroded both the conventional 
methods of administration of the state and the usual claim of liberation movements to 
vanguardism and one-partyism. How the embryo of the popular democratic movements 
will develop will depend on the extent to which the producers are liberated from force 
and coercion in production.
All the social forces with a vested interest in the exploitation and domination of Africa 
are engaged in derailing the achievement of a non-racial democracy, for this form of 
governance promises to enrich the limited democratic participation of voting every five 
years. Central to this democratic process in South Africa is the dismantling of the 
apartheid war machine and the conversion of the military industrial complex of the state.
In  this paper, drawing from the experiences of other liberation movements and 
penetrating the essence of the reform agenda of the Nationalist Party, three main 
possibilities were outlined:
•  A  reform process which could spread the less crude ideas of Eurocentrism 
among the African population. This would bring about some sharing of power 
without essentially changing the present relations of production. This would 
serve to release more African labour for the military.
•  The coming to power of the liberation movements with the integration of the 
present freedom fighters into the weapons system of the SADF: and
•  The development of a new form of economic organization based on the 
dismantling of the SADF and the laying of the basis for the conversion of the 
factories producing weapons. The creation of this new form of defence would 
combine the best traditions of guerilla and conventional forces and draw on the 
experiences of other processes of transformation this century. This new form 
of economic and military organization would be linked to a phased programme 
for the federation of Southern Africa.
Western capital and the local monopolies are the social forces with a vested interest in 
a reform strategy to contain the demand for a living wage and equal education for all. 
Already in Western Europe and North America transnational capital has given notice 
of its intention to economically and politically dominate the continent well into the next 
century. The metaphysics of markets and free enterprise are the ideas which guide the 
reform strategy.
The tremendous energy being channelled into the present reform agenda from both 
inside and outside South Africa should sharpen the need for clarity of the question of 
the transfer of power. The concrete experiences of the advances and reversals in
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post-colonial societies this century have shown the potentialities towards retaining a 
lopsided military structure. The most recent example in Zimbabwe showed that the 
problem of the dismantling of the apartheid economy and military is not simply one of 
the seizure of power. Though this is essential to any programme of transformation, the 
very process of the accession of power will in essence help to determine the pace and 
content of the development of a non-racial democracy.
Liberation is not simply a military/technical issue but a question that is linked to the 
consciousness and political mobilization of the social forces with an interest in 
democratic expression and participation. The alienation of the exploitation of labour 
power in South Africa was compounded by the alienation based on race, the alienation 
based on the organization of the bantustans, the alienation based on the inequality of 
the sexes and the alienation based on rural-urban inequalities. The legacy of die racist 
education system ensures that the present discussion on the post-apartheid society does 
not sufficiently draw the African majority into the full implications of the dismantling 
of the military apparatus and the retooling of the factories.
The monopoly conditions of the survival of South African capital over the past 40 years 
created large-scale production and on this basis an organized and politicized majority 
could speed the process of democratization. This could provide for the creation a new 
society from top to bottom. This process could, as in the words of Franz Fanon, lead to 
a situation where
the people take their destiny in their own hands, assimilate the most modern forms o f technology at an
extraordinary rate.27
Questions of the place of nuclear energy, the method and the mining of minerals, of the 
surpluses from agriculture, of the forms of cooperation with the countries of the region 
are all related to the future of the war jnachine. However, it is not within the scope of 
any one researcher to chart a course for demilitarization. The effort must be to stimulate 
greater discussion and research to the point where the discussion and concrete plans for 
conversion becomes a part of the mass democratic struggle.
In South Africa the failure of apartheid has been compounded by the failure of 
capitalism in Africa in general. The youth, students, workers and the popular clergy 
were not intimidated by repression on a day-to-day basis. And not even the 
destabilization of the region could bring the African peoples to their knees.
The episodes of war pointed to the way in which the ideas of social emancipation had 
taken root in Southern Africa. African workers have given notice that they will not 
subsidize their own repression and challenge capital to live up to its own rhetoric of 
supporting a free market in the market for labour. The experiences of popular alliances 
elsewhere in Africa during the decolonization process show to the working poor that 
even after liberation they can continue to subsidize their own repression. The health, 
safety and security of the working people plus the collective security for the oppressed 
Africans must be the basis of political change in South Africa. The evolution of this 
process is tied up to the process of self-emancipation and self-organization of the people.
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